Book Reviews
Ethical approaches to animal-based science: Proceedings of the Joint
ANZCCART/NAEAC Conference held in Auckland, New Zealand, 19-20
September, 1977, v + 159pp, ANZCCART, New Zealand, 1998.
The Australian and New Zealand Council for the Care of Animals in
Research and Teaching (ANZCCART) is a body active in the
promotion of ethical positions in relation to animal experimentation
while continuing to espouse the benefits of such experimentation. In
1997 with the (New Zealand) National Animal Ethics Advisory
Committee, ANZCCART convened a Conference on this area and
Ethical approaches of animal-based science contains the Conference
papers.
There are six key themes in these papers. In the first contributors
explore the value systems which might operate in ‘animal-based
science’. The expression has a rather ominous ring as it suggests that
the use of animals is necessary to the science to such an extent that
the science could not exist without them. Indeed the papers in this
section do seem to take it as given that animals will always be used
in experimentation in science but in a gentle way they do succeed in
at least showing how ethics has a place in science, a position which
still does not have complete acceptance in the scientific community.
Two papers take up the topic of societal consensus, public policy and
animal welfare awareness looking at public opposition to
experimentation and how this has promoted ‘respect for individual
animals, adherence to the Three Rs, and competent analgesia,
anaesthesia, and after-care.’ (p. 49) It probably would be true to say
there there is no societal consensus on this issue. However the
opposition discussed is portrayed as rather simple minded. For
instance Royce Elliott states that ‘It is still contended that animal
experimentation has been of no benefit to humans’. (p. 50) One does
not have to accept this belief, in order to consistently oppose such
experimentation. It is possible to agree that there have been
enormous benefits but argue for instance that humans have now
reached a state of understanding and sensitivity towards other
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beings such that experimenting on them appears a very undesirable
option.
The third theme deals with the recognition of animal pain and
suffering and refinements of techniques to minimize both of these.
This is well done. A short paper looks at how the Three Rs are
promoted. This is mainly on the functioning of ethics committees.
Some criticisms are mentioned and some interesting legal reforms
suggested. The following grouping of papers explores the operation
of animal ethics committees further. While some pertinent points are
made the question about whether alternatives to animal research are
sufficiently well promoted is not adequately addressed, yet
replacement is one of the Three Rs which many writers say they
support.
The fifth theme is on vertebrate pests (eg possums, goats, pigs and
deer) and their control. These are important concerns in Australia
and New Zealand, with no easy answers. The final section contains
an interesting collection of papers on animal welfare, putting animal
interests first, people first, science first or the environment first.
Denise Russell

Groves, Julian McAllister, Hearts and Minds, 230pp. Temple University
Press, Philadelphia, 1997.
In Hearts and Minds Julian McAllister Groves examines the dynamics
of a localised political debate centred around the use of animals in
medical experiments at an unnamed US university. The book focuses
on two active groups in the debate, an anti-animal experimentation
group called Animals Anon and a group of researchers who use
animals in their studies and who began responding to the protests
staged by Animals Anon. Not aiming to persuade the reader to one
side of the debate or the other, Groves is interested rather in how the
participants in the debate feel about animals in research, ‘why they
feel the way they do, and how they feel about their feelings’ (p. vii)
and to this end offers a vivid and interesting account of a range of
activists and scientists, and their interactions.
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He begins by outlining the main theoretical tool of the book; the
notion of shame, which he sees as central to both ‘sides’ of the
debate. The work of Thomas Scheff is used to identify the presence
of shame in the motives and responses of both animal experimenters
and protesters alike, this being the first of several similarities Groves
constructs between the two groups. He locates himself at length
within the debate by expressing sympathy toward Animals Anon
and towards ‘animal rights’ in general though he does not make
clear precisely what his views on animal experimentation are.
In chapter two Groves identifies what becomes for him a major
dilemma in human/animal interaction, that is the simultaneous use
of animals for human purposes and the keeping of pets (where
strong affective ties to the pets are experienced). How is it that
humans can both love and consume animals? To some, of course, the
keeping of pets and the consumption of animals as food and as
scientific and technological aids is in no way a contradiction, rather,
both may be seen as aspects of an instrumentalist view of animals as
available to meet the needs and desires of humans; for food, freedom
from disease or companionship. This account of animal use is not
investigated however, and the perceived dilemma persists as a
theme throughout the book, supporting the primary notion of
shame.
The ‘dilemma’ is particularly evident in Groves’ account of the
members of Animals Anon, many of whom seem equally concerned
with the simultaneous use of animals as commodities and as pets.
Members are portrayed as primarily, though not exclusively, middle
class women, pet lovers whose initial motivation as a group began
over the routine sale of impounded pets to animal experimenters at
the university. In relation to this focus on pets, Groves notes
amongst these members a wariness toward expressions of sentiment
about animals in debating the rights and wrongs of vivisection, and
an awareness that rational argument may be a more effective means
of securing public support. In contrast, Groves suggests, animal
experimenters tend to shy away from scientific or overly rational
argument, emphasising their connectedness with animals and their
sympathy for the plight of their experimental subjects.
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Both ‘sides’ are acutely aware of the strategic nature of their debate
and the need to present themselves in ways that may prove
influential to the public. Groves acknowledges this, though more
consideration of the implications of the debate as a strategic exercise
would have been most welcome. What does it mean that scientists
feel the need to appear more compassionate and emotional while
animal activists want to appear more logical and dispassionate?
Some brief discussion of gender issues is included here, but a deeper
look at the dichotomising of ‘hearts and minds’ both within the
debate and in western culture generally might have yielded valuable
insights. While Groves claims to investigate how people feel about
animals and how they feel about how they feel, by his own account
he is more likely to uncover how they talk about animals and how
they talk about how they feel. The relations between feeling and
talking in this strategic context needs to be carefully examined.
The book argues for a kind of continuity between the animal
experimenters and Animals Anon, suggesting that both groups feel
compassion for animals and do not wish to see them suffer. Groves
recognises that for scientists, this concern is primarily paternalistic,
with scientists viewing themselves as ‘stewards’ of nature while
many members of Animals Anon reject such a relationship. In spite
of this he argues that ‘animal rights activists and animal research
supporters are not as different as they have been made out to be
with regard to their feelings about animals’. (p. 28) As feminists
amongst others know, the difference between paternalistic concern
for the welfare of a dependent and recognition of the inherent
integrity of a being is fundamental. Groves’ failure to adequately
understand the nature and significance of paternalism here relates to
his earlier ‘dilemma’ about consuming animals and keeping them as
pets. Where both consuming and keeping are understood to be
aspects of a paternalistic or ‘stewardly’ approach, there is no
dilemma.
Groves uses his research into Animals Anon (twenty activists) to
generalise about animal activism and to offer insight into ways of
solving
conflict
between
experimenters
and
protesters.
Unfortunately his extrapolation from such a small sample is
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methodologically unjustified and certainly, his descriptions of the
preoccupations and views of some of the activists interviewed
present them as relatively conservative within the ‘animal rights’
political arena. The group is by no means abolitionist in its shared
outlook and as such, requires very different analysis and
intervention than might groups with an abolitionist agenda. Equally,
the theme of shame bears quite differently upon those who eat
animals and keep pets yet oppose animal experimentation,
compared with those equally opposed who do not keep or eat
animals. While Groves creates quite a complex account of the
differences amongst the activists, he notes that the only African
American activist he saw was excluded from his study as ‘atypical’.
(p. 151) His own varied descriptions would suggest that a ‘typical’
activist might be difficult to identify, though as I have noted,
generalisations on his part are by no means eschewed.
Broadly, the book performs an interesting shift away from the issue
of animal experimentation onto the actors involved in the debate, a
shift that is always a risk for those also concerned with the debate
itself, as Groves claims to be. Focusing on the protagonists in a
struggle over issues of suffering, justice or integrity is valuable
where light is shed on the social context around that debate, or on
strategies, their meaning for the culture in which the debate is
played out and thus the potential for just resolution. Groves
concludes by offering advice as to how the conflict between animal
experimenters and protesters could have been resolved, suggesting
that ‘for the grassroots organisations like Animals Anon, it is clear
that small, symbolic concessions to the activists can diffuse the
controversy’. (p. 192) Here, concern for the just resolution of the
issue of experimentation on animals is superceded by the desire to
end conflict per se, without concern for changes to laboratory
practice or improvement in quality of life for the animals. This may
be an effect of the shift away from the issue toward the protagonists,
where the issue is discarded, in favour of a different ‘problem’; the
resolution of conflict between protagonists themselves.
The book ends by focusing on the insights that conflict resolution to
be found in the animal experimentaion debate through accounts of
specific confrontations that might have proved more fruitful if
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handled differently. Clearly, both ‘sides’ are guilty of inconsistencies
both in their material practices and the opinions they profess and
perhaps what is most unsettling about Hearts and Minds is that while
Groves offers suggestions for better ways to respond or
communicate in specific situations, he rarely adequately draws out
the significance of these inconsistencies to the failure of the
situations or makes the inconsistencies central to the problem and its
resolution. I have already noted that the book is not about the issue
of animal experimentation, but about the protagonists in the debate,
so that prolonged analysis of the subjects’ views may not seem to be
appropriate. However, the value of his insights to other contexts is
uncertain. The extent to which the issue of animal exploitation in
medical research can be satisfactorily resolved through diplomacy
more than through material change remains open, particularly in
relation to abolotionist agendas. Certainly, it is not a tactic that
remains untried outside Groves’ research context.
Suzanne Frazer

Lesley J. Rogers and Gisela Kaplan. Not Only Roars and Rituals:
Communication in Animals, x + 230pp
Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998.
The question of enshrining animal rights in law is currently being
debated in the New Zealand parliament. A bill has been proposed
which will recognise primates' fundamental rights not to suffer cruel
and degrading treatment. In an article in the Sydney Morning Herald
reporting this debate, the World Society for the Protection of
Animals is cited as supporting the recognition of apes' rights for the
reason that humans and apes are 97% genetically identical. New
Scientist, however, is quoted as critical of this idea, stating that this
fact of genetic similarity does not justify the recognition of rights.
Interestingly, New Scientist argues that the test of similarity to
humans should instead be based upon language use: ‘Language that
allows thinking about thinking should be the test of similarity to
humans’. 1

1

Sydney Morning Herald, 13.2.99, p. 30.
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Even overlooking the question of the privileging of thinking in this
view (why should thinking about thinking be more important than,
for instance, thinking about feeling, or even feeling about feeling?),
the question of language use in animals is one which has vast
significance for animal rights. A book which deals in detail with
animal communication, then, could have direct political
consequences for the treatment of animals by humans.
The opening statement, ‘Researching animal behaviour is a
humbling experience’, gives the reader a good guide to the approach
of Lesley Rogers and Gisela Kaplan in Not Only Roars and Rituals.
This is a special book because of its rare combination of scientific
learning and detailed up-to-date information with the authors' own
experiences in communicating with animals (from scientific field
trips and from their domestic environment), and their obvious love
and respect for animals. This combination of the personal and the
scientific blends in a highly readable and clear account of issues
around communication across many animal species (from primates
to birds and dolphins, amongst others), and articulates a clear ethical
and scientific position on humans' relation to, and understanding of,
animals.
Rogers' and Kaplan's credentials in the field of animal
communication are impressive. Rogers holds a Personal Chair in
Neuroscience and Animal Behaviour at the University of New
England, Australia, and is the author of over 200 scientific papers
and a number of books (including Minds of Their Own: Thinking and
Awareness in Animals). 2 She is well known for her work in the area of
brain development and function. In 1994 she and Kaplan also coauthored a book on their field study of orang-utans, entitled Orangutans in Borneo. Kaplan is a social scientist and ethologist who has a
special interest in communication in primates and vocalisation in
birds. As becomes clear in the book, she is also very involved in
wildlife rehabilitation, specialising in native bird rehabilitation.
Rogers' and Kaplan's combined experience and knowledge then is
scientific, personal, and practical.

2

Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1997.
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Not Only Roars and Rituals functions as a clear and detailed
introduction to the field of animal communication. Many of its
chapters are issue-based, and cover the questions ‘What is
communication?’, ‘Is animal signalling intentional or unintentional?’
and ‘Do animals learn to communicate, or is communication
genetically based?’. These significant and fundamental questions are
explored with numerous examples both from the scientific literature
and from evidence from the authors' experience in living and
working with animals. Two other chapters focus on communication
in birds and mammals respectively, and there is also a final more
discursive chapter on human-animal relationships. Issues of
scientific methodology and research ethics are addressed in relation
to the research reported in each chapter. Rogers and Kaplan give
concise explanations of how such research is undertaken, note any
problematic ethical considerations, and outline the logic of the
research methodologies. They also suggest further areas of research
in many instances. For the reader without a background in this field,
then, the book's approach is very valuable.
Perhaps the most fundamental question addressed by Rogers and
Kaplan is that concerning differences between humans and animals.
In their analysis of animal communication they are interested not
only in the hundreds of interesting facts cited, but also in providing
a point of view on the philosophical and ethical question of the
human/animal distinction. In relation to this, Rogers and Kaplan are
concerned to point out the error of assuming that just because it does
not look as though animals are communicating we can know that
they are not. As they argue, animals can be shown to communicate
in ways which are neither audible nor visible to humans (these
include the use of ultraviolet signals, ultrasonic emissions, odour
emissions and seismic signals). The development of innovative
research techniques (such as the use of sound spectograms, which
can graph the frequencies of animal sounds which are inaudible to
human ears) is necessary here, and Rogers and Kaplan give many
examples.
Even more basic is the issue of whether animals can be said to
communicate in a way that bears any resemblance to human
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communication. Using numerous examples, Rogers and Kaplan
argue that animals do indeed communicate with intention and do
learn to communicate (rather than such communication being simply
a product of genetic programming). Citing the well-known examples
of Alex the parrot (trained by Irene Pepperberg at the University of
Arizona), Washoe the chimpanzee (trained by Allen and Beatrix
Gardner of the University of Nevada) and Kanzi the bonobo (trained
by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh), and others, Rogers and Kaplan
demonstrate that animals can be shown to understand and even to
use human language. This destroys one of the most central
arguments made for the human/animal distinction, namely that
humans use language in a unique way.
Studies of animal-animal communication (as opposed to animalhuman communication) also indicate that the complex use of
language is not a unique human quality. Rogers and Kaplan cite
studies of dolphin and whale communications which show that
these animals not only use unique identifying codes for particular
animals (which are used like names), but that particular groups
share communication elements which are understood only within
their groups and by other members of the same species (thus
forming animal communication cultures). These findings show that
animal communications are not simply genetic but, like human
languages, are learned, individually meaningful, and even cultural.
Roars and Rituals leaves the reader with a clear sense both of the
complexity of scientific research into animal communication and of
the fascinating diversity of communication systems and abilities. My
one criticism of this book is that the stories told in relation to these
are often overly short and leave the reader wanting more details.
The wealth of different tales is great, but it can be a little
monotonous if none of these are developed to any great extent. For
example, we are given tantalising glimpses into Kaplan's work
rehabilitating birds and her resulting knowledge of their
communication systems, but these are glimpses only. On occasion I
would have liked to read fewer examples, but to gain a more
indepth insight into one of the examples cited. The characters of this
book are so interesting, some of them deserve a longer story!
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In general though, the book makes a powerful and important
argument about the complexity of animal interactions and the
problematic nature of any clear animal/human distinction based on
language use, and should be widely read for this reason.
Celia Roberts

Clark, Stephen R. L., Animals and their Moral Standing, viii + 194pp.,
Routledge, London and New York, 1997.
In the introduction to this collection of papers, written over a period
of some twenty years, Stephen Clark draws attention to two aspects
of his work which may be of concern to some readers. First, he
points out that those who seek them may well find inconsistencies in
the papers, and will certainly find some repetition. While this might
be seen as meriting criticism in a continuous work, it would be more
worrying, in this context, if the papers showed no sign of change and
development over time. Such change is quite compatible with an
overall consistency which rests on Clark’s unvarying respect for
animals and concern for their defence.
A single example will serve to illustrate the point above. Four of the
essays deal with the question of rights for animals. All four also
include a discussion of utilitarian theory, and of the significance of
the inclusion of non-human animals in the utilitarian calculation of
the greater good. Although Clark acknowledges that the ‘good
utilitarian’ does not believe in rights, he nevertheless explores ways
in which some utilitarians have been prepared to allow rights to
both humans and other animals, and he explores other theoretical
routes to the same end. At the same time, it becomes quite evident
that Clark, himself, is strongly opposed to utilitarianism which, in
the final essay, ‘Modern Errors, Ancient Virtues’, he identifies as a
principle ‘bereft of rational support’, and he shows little more regard
for rights-based theories. He is not, of course, opposed to rights for
animals, but sees them as being of little significance in practice. One
must therefore ask why Clark has spent so much care in the
examination of views with which he finds himself increasingly at
odds. At one point, Clark seems to suggest that this is simply what
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philosophers do, but there is, of course, a purpose underlying the
activity. It is often productive to engage with those who seek the
same end through different means. It may be even more useful to see
that the same theory can be used to serve quite different ends.
The second matter which Clark brings to our attention in the
introduction is the fact that he writes as a Christian philosopher.
There is little in the following essays which is likely to prove
unpalatable to even the most convinced atheist, but this profession
of faith is still of some interest. For most of its history, Christian
teaching has expressed little concern for the non-human, and Clark
specifically rejects what he speaks of as humanist Christianity. When
he wishes to give examples of ‘ancient virtues’, of a time when there
was more familiarity between human and non-human, it is to the
pre-Christian Scriptures that he turns. These scriptural allusions are,
in any case, rare, and Clark is quite ready for them to be treated as
metaphor, but there is little doubt that his religious faith gives
support to some of his philosophical attitudes, to his confident
realism and to his holistic approach to the care for the biosphere.
What interests me most in this book, however, is not that Clark is a
professed Christian, but that he is a professed zoophile with an
interest in both biology and ethology.
Although I do not wish to underestimate the contribution made by
Peter Singer to the debate on the treatment of animals, I have always
been somewhat disconcerted by his simultaneous dismissal of
‘animal-lovers’ and his insistence that the moral principle of equal
consideration of interests should not be arbitrarily restricted to
members of our own species. It is difficult to see how we can give
any rational consideration of interests to members of a species about
which we know little and care nothing. Like Singer, Clark is fully
aware of the dangers of sentimentalism, but he argues that
sentiment, that is, personal and unreflective attachment or attraction,
may be the prelude to rational discovery. In ‘The Consciousness of
Animals’, he suggests that knowledge arises from a loving attention
to what is knowable, a view that he fully recognises as a rejection of
the postulates of the Enlightenment. It is just such attention to a
creature’s particularity that gives us the hope of discovering what it
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perceives and how it does so, knowledge which would make us the
better able to consider its interests.
Clark does not only link sentiment and knowledge, but argues
strongly that natural sentiments are the necessary roots of morality.
Morality does not develop through the exercise of reason, but
through local and familial concerns for children and friends. As
Clark says, aphoristically, we are moral because we are mammalian,
and there is much evidence to support his view. Behaviour that we
regard as good, care for those in need of care, is to be found in
mammals other than humans, and this care is not always confined to
conspecifics. Certainly, as Clark points out, the human family, from
its beginnings, has included members of other species. Clark is not
suggesting that reason has no part in morality, or that moral
obligation ends with the family, or even at the threshold of the cities
that he sees as the set of households, but, however far our
responsibility extends, even if it is over the whole earth and into
space, our moral sensibility develops in our immediate family and is
extended from there.
There will no doubt be some who find Clark’s views objectionable.
As he, himself, admits, if he is right, it is not possible to quite
eliminate subjective discrimination without destroying the natural
roots of our morality. One might argue that this is accurate
observation rather than theory, but there will be those who seek
greater objectivity and prefer to see morality as the province of
rational adults, presumably human, even if their duty of care
extends to members of other species.
Tom Regan, whose work is discussed in several essays, shares with
Clark the view that there is no discoverable difference between all
humans and all non-humans that would license different moral
treatment, but he attempts to justify this view in a very different
way. Regan makes use of the Kantian notion of the human subject as
end-in-itself and therefore worthy of respect. He notes that for Kant
the subject is a rational subject and that this excludes some human
beings, infants and the senile, for example, and he suggests a
different category, subject-of-a-life, which would include the
previously excluded, both human and other animals. Clark treats
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Regan’s arguments sympathetically, but he points out that the only
rights that all subjects-of-a-life could have seem to be the very
minimal ones of extreme right-wing liberalism. As he says, what
concerns him is not abstract political rights but concrete historical
ones, and he admits, quite frankly, that he is more concerned about
the rights of ‘British beasts’ than about the natural rights of all other
animals. This is wholly in accord with his perception of morality as
having its origins in nature, in the family, and I venture to suggest
that, in the same way, Australian readers of this review are likely to
be concerned about Australian animals. They are the ones closest to
us, the ones with which we are familiar, and the ones with which we,
sometimes reluctantly, share our territory, and these animals may be
the natives who live in our gardens or nearby national parks, the
dogs who sleep at our feet, or the farm animals on display at the
agricultural show.
Although I have attempted to give some indication of the topics
addressed by Clark in this book, I have not been very successful in
conveying the flavour of the work as a whole. Clark has indicated
that he writes as a Christian, but I would suggest that he also writes
as an Aristotelian. The two are, of course, not incompatible, but, in
my view, it is the influence of Aristotle that dominates in this
context. It can be seen in the frequent quotations, in the belief in the
natural origin of the moral law, in the effort to perceive the quiddity
of other animals, which is surely nothing other than Aristotelian
form by another name. Above all, it can be seen in Clark’s constant
effort to engage in constructive dialogue, to find a middle way in the
many disputes which bedevil those who try to think about animals
and about what it is to do good in relation to them.
Felicity Sutcliffe
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